A Letter to the Editor of the A.H.R. (July 1957)
To the Editor of the American Historical Review:
Mr. Zagorin’s concern (AHR, October, 1956, pp. 1-11) over Becker’s “skeptical fallacy” may be accounted so much playing with words by many historians who are engrossed in their own area of specialization.This is another round in the argument between theorist and skeptic, with touché again going to the skeptic, Professor Gershoy in this case.
Before theorist and skeptic again go their separate ways, I should like to propose an exercise in perspective, namely, a reversing of roles, by which we might throw some new light on the historical process – if there is one.While those whose inclination is to say hopefully with Zagorin that history is “not unknowable” stand by “infected with skeptical doubts,” let those whose inclination is to cheer Gershoy’s defense of skepticism make a try at “knowing” history.Let them take on, temporarily, the uncongenial hypothesis with which the theorists begin – there is a true, coherent, and explicable historical process at work in this world – then with uncharacteristic temerity set down its main outlines.
“But impossible,” the reply will be.“We cannot in good historian’s conscience start from such an assumption or make such an attempt.There are a thousand reasons why: not only the unknown, but our prejudices, our environment; we are nationals of a particular country, products of a single civilization, specialists in a small segment of history.Even if we were thoroughly versed in all historical fields, a dozen other branches of knowledge impinge upon the subject.Even if the facts were there, our spectacles are hopelessly colored.Look at Toynbee’s ten volumes of beautifully written ‘theoretical fallacy.’ Perhaps in a hundred years…”
But those who answer this way are the ones to try.Business men have given us the methodological key their “let’s-hear-your-idea-no-matter-how-crazy-it-is” sessions, where criticism, including self-criticism, is reserved for later.And for those who plead they do not have the time, let the exercise be limited not to ten volumes but to ten pages.
Having set up this proposition, it is only fair that this reader, an inveterate scoffer at historical systems, might try out the hypothesis: “There is a true, coherent, and explicable historical process at work in the world.”This may be built around something like problem sets.As to the origin of these problem sets, suffice it to say that the force which originated them would be the same one which set the human brain to thinking about them.Perhaps the human race encounters four main problem sets, which are interrelated but distinguishable.
Problem set #1 – “Physical Science,” from primitive agriculture to advanced engineering, physics and medicine, including economics of production.Cold, heat, hunger, and disease cause man discomfort.However, in the ground, sea, and air of this globe called Earth are resources which, if discovered and utilized, will enable him to attain material and physical well-being.These resources are hidden, some in easily discovered places (apples in trees), but others are literally imbedded in illusions (oil in underground lakes in seemingly desolate areas, electricity in waterfalls, energy in atoms, and certainly much more).The objective is their discovery and utilization.Not until recently have anything but hit or miss methods been applied to this, though gradually the realization that there are discoverable secrets of inestimable possibility has dawned, and men are organizing the search.
Problem set #2 – “Social Science,” from primitive family and clan politics to world political systemizing, including economics of distribution.If men fight they hurt each other but if, on the contrary, they do not fight but help each other, they can move forward much more rapidly to physical and material well-being.The objective is to find out how to keep from fighting.But why has it been so difficult?This is because there are several built-in illusions in the social as in the physical world, illusions which have taken centuries to identify, e.g., that one section of mankind can prosper at the expense of another, that skin color is a real differential.Man has made some progress in solving these “in groups” of broadening dimension, but he is just beginning to discover that the whole human race is in reality an “in group.”The illusions are what make the problem, just as the fact that the physical resources are hidden makes their discovery a problem.
Problem set #3 – “Humanities,” from child’s play to great literature and art.The objective may be defined simply as “discovering the joy of living,” though this is a very subtle proposition.Whereas finding the way to material and physical well-being and social amiability may constitute the “serious business” of the human race, the beauty of the world itself provides a first reminder to the observant that “serious business” should not be grim.And the fact that human difficulties and frailties can become “joy” in the theater suggests that the “light touch” is indeed the light which, brought into focus, can illuminate the serious problems, #1 and #2.
Problem set #4 – “Mental Science,” philosophy, psychology, religion, metaphysics.Here man attempts to discover the method of instruction.He has been singularly dogmatic on this most elusive subject, which, since it concerns his relation to the mechanism of the universe, may require the mastery of the first three problem sets as the final key to its solution.Certain observations, however, may be made.The fact that resources are so ingeniously hidden and our horizons are literally bound up in illusions (e.g., the world is flat) until we move around and get new angles and perspectives suggests immediately that the problem solving is of the “do it yourself” variety.And the fact that a person may take his own life or kill another should be clear enough indication that the will is free.Let philosophy rest here.Psychology, however, has discovered that certain basic urges compel, or at least propel, man to become involved in the problems.Urges to relieve discomfort, to reproduce, and to play (see Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens) cause him to give his attention to problems #1, #2, and #3 respectively, though they do not guarantee that he will solve them or even define them (hence no “laws” of history).In addition, religion has vehemently attested that mankind is favored occasionally with what we call revelations, enlightenment, satori, flashes of insight received by various individuals – Moses, Jesus, Buddha, Paul, Zoroaster, Bodhidharma, Mani, Mohammed, Nanak, George Fox, Joseph Smith, Hung Hsiu-ch’uan of the T’ai-p’ings, Choi of the Tong Haks, and perhaps hundreds of unknowns.How do we account for these?Are they merely prevarications or imaginings?Some weight must be given to the possibility that they are not, that they represent, shall we say, “hints,” imperfectly understood by individuals standing in the context of their own place, time, and limited knowledge of the world, and garbled by followers with a penchant for associating “revealed truths” with their own group – but hints, nevertheless, which give man encouragement that the unseen force behind his problems has some interest in his progress and which at the same time help him toward the broad perspective necessary for their solution.
History, then, is the record of man’s efforts to define and solve the multitude of problems which constitute the subsections of these problem sets.
Preposterous?But if Zagorin is right, if history is “knowable,” why should we assume we are unable to see its main outlines.If some of the “tough-minded,” whose inclination is to batter rather than build theories, made a try, we might get further than we think.
University of PennsylvaniaHilary Conroy